Object-Dependent Thought Without Illusion I am grateful to Tim Crane, Rory Madden, Susanna Siegel, Mark Textor, José Zalabardo and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments on the material for this paper. Thanks are also due to the CSMN Colloquium audience at the University of Oslo in February 2014, where an earlier version of this paper was presented

When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object - singular thought - is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this view to be committed to postulation of illusions of object-dependent thought in cases like that mentioned. The core ingredient in my illusion-free version of the view is a special form of disjunctivism. Alleged cases of illusion are not considered parasitic on 'the good case' where the object thought about is perceived.