Congressional–Executive Balance in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction

During my years as a doctoral student in political science at Yale University (1964-69), I had a front-row seat in the US Senate, returning each summer to the staff of Senator E.L. "Bob" Bartlett, Democrat of Alaska. My time in the Senate coincided with my search for a dissertation topic; I soon concluded that what I was observing and experiencing was at odds with what many political scientists were saying about the presidential-congressional balance of power at that time of great governmental activism. "The President is now the motor in the system," one of the most eminent declared. "The Congress applies the brakes" (Dahl 1967). I set out to complicate if not refute this generalization, developing case histories for a range of major bills, including both Great Society initiatives and others with predominantly congressional origins. I concluded that the congressional role had often been robust and, moreover, that executive and congressional roles were often cooperative and complementary, hardly to be viewed in zero-sum terms. Unified Democratic control of both houses obviously enhanced President Johnson's ability to work his legislative will, but it also allowed senators like Warren Magnuson, Phillip Hart, and Ralph Yarborough to advance ideas that they had long nurtured to fruition (Price 1972). A similar inter-branch dynamic characterized the first two years of Barack Obama's presidency, but the 2010 elections returned the country to divided government, with the House under the control of an increasingly rightward-leaning Republican Party. The balance of power among the institutions of government was bound to shift, but, again, not necessarily in zero-sum terms. In fact, I will argue that while the subsequent congressional dysfunction and default prompted the executive to compensate, the net result was to make both branches less effectual.