Harmful transparency in teams

In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2016-07, Vol.144, p.88-91
Hauptverfasser:	Bag, Parimal Kanti, Pepito, Nona
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Free-riding Perfect substitution Preferences Project management Studies Team Teamwork Transparency Utilitarianism
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if team members are inequity-averse.
ISSN:	0165-1765 1873-7374
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005