Political Patronage in Greece: Persistence or Change in Times of Fiscal Crisis?

Clientelism in the form of 'trading' political votes against benefits and rewards in the public sector can be understood as one of the main features of the post-war Greek political culture. In debt-ridden Greece of 2015, such long-established patterns of rewarding political followers have become difficult for political leaders because the international creditors demand that the country should reduce its public spending. The article investigates the question if patterns of clientelism and patronage are consequently changing in Greece. In the main part of the contribution, a case-in-point regarding the pattern of patronage is discussed: the so-called Lagarde list. The Lagarde list, a document containing roughly 2,000 names of potential Greek tax evaders with accounts at a Swiss bank, was delivered to the then Minister of Finance G. Papakonstantinou in October 2010. A detailed reconstruction of what happened after receiving this important information and what kind of action was taken (or not) by the Greek governments reveals a pertaining pattern of political patronage. By delaying relevant instructions and by postponing tax investigations, politicians in Athens managed to protect wealthy Greek depositors in Swiss banks, which happened to be family, friends or members of the ruling parties. Finally, a conclusion is drawn stressing the persisting relevance of patronage because of the debt crisis.