To Negotiate or Not to Negotiate, That is the Question: A Cost Analysis of a Non-Negotiation Policy

This paper seeks to understand the rationality and potential value of maintaining a "non-negotiation" policy as opposed to a more ambiguous approach in which negotiation is one of multiple possible actions. Under the assumption that terrorists start as actors desiring political change, a formal model of a sequential game between a group with an agenda of political change and a government is presented. The model shows that costs for the government occur at a greater speed than the costs for the would-be terrorist group, but costs are dependent on government type. Democratic governments are more likely to want to end the game early, while nondemocratic governments may be in a better position to wait out the would-be terrorist group. Additionally preemption becomes more likely for nondemocratic governments when the probability is high that the group desiring political change will engage in hostility and for democratic governments when the government lacks the ability to negotiate or the costs of doing so are high. Taken together, the model shows that a strict non-negotiation policy never leads to lower costs for the government.