WHEN CONGRESS SPEAKS, DOES THE SUPREME COURT LISTEN? EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DURING THE REHNQUIST COURT

Some argued that Congress signaled that it had little institutional stake in the federalism-related matters that dominated the Second Rehnquist Court11 and noted that many of those landmark Rehnquist Court rulings were not followed by talk of stripping the Court's jurisdiction, amending the Con...

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Veröffentlicht in:Texas review of law & politics 2015-10, Vol.20 (1), p.79
Hauptverfasser: McLauchlan, Judithanne Scourfield, Gay, Thomas
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Some argued that Congress signaled that it had little institutional stake in the federalism-related matters that dominated the Second Rehnquist Court11 and noted that many of those landmark Rehnquist Court rulings were not followed by talk of stripping the Court's jurisdiction, amending the Constitution, or enacting counter-legislation.12 Instead, Congress enacted fast-track provisions into legislation, seeking expedited review by the courts, which in effect delegated its authority to interpret the Constitution to the Supreme Court.13 Examples of legislation with such fast-track provisions include the Communications Decency Act, the Line Item Veto Act, the McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation, census reform legislation, and library internet filtering legislation.14 Professor Neal Devins asserted that Congress seemed oblivious to its fate, and "rather than condemn the Court and launch a counteroffensive, Congress has paid little notice to the Court's decisionmaking. [...]we will reflect on the implications of these findings for our understanding of CongressCourt relations during the Rehnquist Court.
ISSN:1098-4577
1942-8618