REVISITING ASYMMETRIC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: WHY THE U.S. LOST THE BATTLE OF IMAGES AFTER IRAQ?
Ten years after the military intervention, this paper revisits why the United States lost the psychological warfare in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Even though the Bush administration poured billions of dollars into public diplomacy campaigns, it became increasingly evident that Washington's...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Uluslararası hukuk ve politika 2015-10, Vol.11 (44), p.33 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Ten years after the military intervention, this paper revisits why the United States lost the psychological warfare in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Even though the Bush administration poured billions of dollars into public diplomacy campaigns, it became increasingly evident that Washington's efforts dramatically failed to change underlying anti-American predispositions in the Middle East. The misconduct and hubris of the Bush administration throughout the prolonged occupation were highly counter-productive, debilitating America's standing in the region. Middle Easterners became highly guarded against arguments of American propaganda that experienced crises of sincerity and reliability. The Arab Spring galvanized nationalism and resistance to external interventions. The surge of electronic communication technology played a key role in the anti-American political awakening as aggravated groups skillfully broadcasted anti-Western doctrines and images. Extensive use of cyber communication among the resistance forces created an "evil image" of the world's superpower among the Middle Eastern societies. Western governments could control neither the resurgent Arab media nor the transmittance of negative propaganda on the internet. Moreover, the United States failed to respond to the developments and reconnect with the Muslim World even after the Arab Spring. None of the post-revolutionary Arab governments embraced a pro-American stance and the rapid erosion of U.S. soft power made the war on terror unwinnable. |
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ISSN: | 1305-5208 |