Bank Capital Regulation: Theory, Empirics, and Policy
Minimum equity ratio requirements promote bank stability, but compliance must be measured credibly and requirements must be commensurate with risk. A mix of higher book equity requirements, a carefully designed contingent capital requirement, cash reserve requirements, and other measures, would addr...
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Veröffentlicht in: | IMF economic review 2015-01, Vol.63 (4), p.955-983 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Minimum equity ratio requirements promote bank stability, but compliance must be measured credibly and requirements must be commensurate with risk. A mix of higher book equity requirements, a carefully designed contingent capital requirement, cash reserve requirements, and other measures, would address prudential objectives better than book equity requirements alone. Basel III’s ill-defined liquidity ratios, book capital ratios, and internal models of risk must be replaced by a system of credible, incentive-robust rules that combine valid concepts with objective, market-based information into a simplified and credible regulatory process. Raising minimum capital requirements will not be socially costless; bank profitability, share prices, and loan supply are likely to suffer. But avoiding the dramatic consequences of banking crises would more than repay those costs. |
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ISSN: | 2041-4161 2041-417X |
DOI: | 10.1057/imfer.2015.18 |