The Polythink Syndrome and Elite Group Decision-Making

How do presidents and their advisors make war and peace decisions on military intervention, escalation, deescalation, and termination of conflicts? How do groups make decisions? Why do they often make suboptimal decisions or appear to be frozen in inaction? The leading concept of group dynamics, Gro...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Political psychology 2016-02, Vol.37 (S1), p.3-21
Hauptverfasser: Mintz, Alex, Wayne, Carly
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:How do presidents and their advisors make war and peace decisions on military intervention, escalation, deescalation, and termination of conflicts? How do groups make decisions? Why do they often make suboptimal decisions or appear to be frozen in inaction? The leading concept of group dynamics, Groupthink, offers one explanation: cohesive policymaking groups, such as advisors to the president, often make suboptimal decisions due to their desire for uniformity over dissent, while ignoring important limitations of chosen policies, overestimating the odds for success and failing to consider other relevant policy options or possibilities. But groups, including presidential advisory teams, are often fragmented and divisive. We thus introduce Polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and offer divergent policy prescriptions, which can result in intragroup conflict, a disjointed decision-making process, and decision paralysis as each group member pushes for his or her preferred policy action. This phenomenon is no less problematic or common than Groupthink and explains how otherwise smart, experienced decision-makers can engage in flawed decision-making processes that deeply affect the security and welfare of a country. By shining a light on Polythink's symptoms and consequences, and on the factors that lead to Polythink, we seek to offer actionable policy prescriptions for elite decision-makers to offset the negative attributes of this phenomenon and engage in more optimal policymaking processes. Furthermore, we explain how leaders and other decision-makers (e.g., in business) can transform Destructive Polythink into Productive Polythink, illuminating the potential ways in which this group dynamic may be effectively directed towards sound decisions.
ISSN:0162-895X
1467-9221
DOI:10.1111/pops.12319