Is Hobby Lobby a tool for limiting corporate constitutional rights?(Symposium: Money, Politics, Corporations and the Constitution)
Critics lament that with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc, the Supreme Court further expanded corporate personhood powers. Here, Taub offers an alternative reading. She suggests that Hobby Lobby might actually provide a tool for limiting previously recognized corporate constitutional rights. To tho...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Constitutional commentary 2015-06, Vol.30 (2), p.403 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Critics lament that with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc, the Supreme Court further expanded corporate personhood powers. Here, Taub offers an alternative reading. She suggests that Hobby Lobby might actually provide a tool for limiting previously recognized corporate constitutional rights. To those who oppose the decision, this assertion might seem unduly optimistic. After all, the Court did determine that three family-owned business corporations were "persons" with sincere religious beliefs entitled to use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") to deprive employees of federally mandated healthcare insurance coverage. Given that the Court determined that certain "closely held" business corporations possessed statutory rights previously thought reserved to real human beings, it would not seem to presage the future restriction of corporate constitutional rights. However, by designating (thus far) just closely-held corporations as persons with free-exercise rights under RFRA the Court invites to question whether other corporations (that lack similar attributes) would be denied such personhood. And, if so, whether a distinction between closely-held corporations and others could be applied to curtail corporate constitutional rights. |
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ISSN: | 0742-7115 2639-7277 |