Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises

In October 2006, some 50 years after North Korea began its nuclear journey, it detonated a nuclear device and declared itself a nuclear power. A second explosion, in May 2009, erased lingering doubts about its ability to build the bomb. It is instructive to learn how, but even more important to understand why, it built the bomb. Pyongyang has proclaimed its reason for going nuclear: "The DPRK made nuclear weapons and has strengthened its self-defensive war deterrent to maintain the sovereignty and the right to existence of the nation inthe face of the increased aggressive threat by the U.S." But is the alleged threat to Pyongyang's security the only reason it built the bomb? This chapter briefly reviews what North Korea's nuclear capabilities are and shows how technical capabilities and political intent were inextricably intertwined in shaping the program. The chapter then turns to Scott Sagan's theoretical framework of three models for the bomb to show how Pyongyang's deep security fears, augmented by domestic and diplomatic drivers, have dominated its decision to build and keep the bomb. The chapter concludes with lessons learned from North Korea for the nonproliferation regime.