Between Peace and War: The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea

Skeptics and supporters of the Six-Party talks avoid one critical question: What will be the next step if the multi-national talks fail to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program? It is not too soon to consider what other options might be available. Intensifying North Korea's international isolation and imposing a stronger economic embargo are options that have been discussed, but they may be no more successful than dialogue in ridding North Korea of its nuclear weapons program. Which works better on North Korea: pressure or engagement? The answer depends on what goals are sought, and on how expensive it is to apply pressure or offer engagement. The broad goals outlined in the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy (based on a "distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests") are three in number: (1) political and economic freedom; (2) peaceful relations with other states; and (3) respect for human dignity (White House, 2002, p. 1). More specific non-proliferation goals that might be achieved by sanctions (for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI) include interdicting shipments of WMD material and contraband that originate from, or are destined for, states of "proliferation concern" (IISS, 2003). Broader goals for Washington's North Korea policy announced at one time or another include: (1) A verifiable end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program and a resumption of North Korea's NPT membership; (2) An end to the development and sale of North Korean missiles; (3) An end to the biological and chemical weapons programs; (4) An end to state-sponsored drug smuggling and counterfeiting operations; (5) A conventional force reduction and pull back from the DMZ; (6) Better human rights for North Korean citizens; and (7) A fuller accounting for Japanese abductees. Alternative strategies (used separately or in combination) to achieve these goals are: (1) Building international consensus; (2) Establishing and enforcing treaties; (3) Initiating export controls; (4) Entering into arms control agreements; (5) Provision of economic assistance; (6) Initiation of confidence-building measures; (7) Imposition of sanctions; and (7) Exercise of military action (Davis, 2003, pp. 59-67).