LE ROLE DES MECANISMES DE GOUVERNANCE DANS LA DETERMINATION DE LA REMUNERATION DES DIRIGEANTS : UNE ANALYSE DES SOCIETES COTEES AU SBF 120

This article focuses on the impact of governance mechanisms on the compensation policy of the French CEO. The theoretical of this article is the agency theory, the dominant theory in the study of the determinants of executive compensation. From a sample of 91 French companies from 2006 to 2010, we examine the impact of board characteristics, the presence of a compensation committee, as well as the ownership structure on the CEO compensation. The interest of this paper is to complete the existing literature, mostly American, providing results from a different context: the French context that has specific regarding ownership structure. Our results show that all indicators measuring the level of control exercised by the governance mechanisms are not significant. Our results show that the presence of independent directors on the board of directors and on the compensation committee is linked to a higher level of compensation. In addition, the indicators measuring the level of control exercised over the ownership structure are not significant.