Mostly calibrated
Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (J Econ Theory 146(5):2029–2041, 2011 ) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, c...
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Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of game theory 2015-02, Vol.44 (1), p.153-163 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (J Econ Theory 146(5):2029–2041,
2011
) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, category I, set of distributions. We present a prequential test based on calibration that also fails the informed forecaster on at most a category I set of true distributions and is non-manipulable. Our construction sheds light on the relationship between likelihood and calibration with respect to the distributions they reject. |
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ISSN: | 0020-7276 1432-1270 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-014-0423-0 |