Mostly calibrated

Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (J Econ Theory 146(5):2029–2041, 2011 ) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, c...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of game theory 2015-02, Vol.44 (1), p.153-163
Hauptverfasser: Feinberg, Yossi, Lambert, Nicolas S.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (J Econ Theory 146(5):2029–2041, 2011 ) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, category I, set of distributions. We present a prequential test based on calibration that also fails the informed forecaster on at most a category I set of true distributions and is non-manipulable. Our construction sheds light on the relationship between likelihood and calibration with respect to the distributions they reject.
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-014-0423-0