Blueprint for Arab-Israeli Peace? President Carter and the Brookings Report

After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger's step-by-step approach had stagnated...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Diplomacy and statecraft 2014-07, Vol.25 (3), p.492-508
1. Verfasser: Jensehaugen, Jørgen
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger's step-by-step approach had stagnated. New approaches seemed essential to push the peace process forward. Throughout 1975, a Brookings Institution study group wrote a report on how the United States could better approach Arab-Israeli peacemaking. It recommended a comprehensive approach, aimed at solving all outstanding questions, by including all the parties within the same framework. The recommendations advocated including the Soviet Union in the peace process and that the Palestinians should represent themselves. The report was highly influential on President Jimmy Carter's subsequent approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict-and many of the report's authors staffed his Administration. Carter's perceived adaptation of the report aggrieved the Israelis, whilst for others the Brookings report served as a normative benchmark for the Carter presidency.
ISSN:0959-2296
1557-301X
DOI:10.1080/09592296.2014.936199