Models and scientific representations or: who is afraid of inconsistency?

Models and scientific representations or: who is afraid of inconsistency?

I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2014-09, Vol.191 (13), p.3027-3040
1. Verfasser: Frisch, Mathias
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Charged particles
Education
Electrodynamics
Epistemology
Equations of motion
Logic
Lorentz force
Mental objects
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Physical theory
Physics
Proton beams
Quantum mechanics
Synchrotrons
Theory
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-014-0471-9