Underperformance of founder-led firms: An examination of compensation contracting theories during the executive stock options backdating scandal

Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control sample...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of corporate finance (Amsterdam, Netherlands) Netherlands), 2013-12, Vol.23, p.294-310
Hauptverfasser:	Carver, Brian T., Cline, Brandon N., Hoag, Matthew L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Chief executive officers Decision making Executive compensation Founder CEO Managerial power Optimal contracting Option backdating Scandals Stock options Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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