Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity

Jonathan Vogel is the father of the problem of bootstrapping. Vogel originally held that bootstrapping presents a problem for externalist theories of knowledge. His focus was on reliabilism. Vogel was taken to task by Stewart Cohen, in another widely discussed paper, for failing to realize that Vogels evidentialist internalism (hereafter EI) is also open to a bootstrapping problem. As Vogel says, Tu Quoque! In this article, I want to examine Vogels response to Cohen. I will argue that Vogels response is unsuccessful. Vogel wishes to distinguish EI from reliabilism by providing his theory with a way of blocking bootstrapping. But I will argue that the reliabilist can avail himself of the same strategy, thereby placing his theory on a par with Vogels in respect of anti-bootstrapping power.