Incommensurability or Vagueness? A Comment on Rabinowicz and Sugden
Items are incommensurate if it is false that one is better than the other or that they are exactly as or equally good. John Broome claims that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain), but that there is vagueness. Wlodek Rabinowicz casts doubt on this claim because he rejects a principle w...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2012-10, Vol.112 (3), p.333-338 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Items are incommensurate if it is false that one is better than the other or that they are exactly as or equally good. John Broome claims that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain), but that there is vagueness. Wlodek Rabinowicz casts doubt on this claim because he rejects a principle which Broome adopts in advancing it. I argue that Robert Sugden's discussion can be interpreted as advancing a version of this claim which does not depend on the relevant principle and which can respond to certain objections. |
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ISSN: | 0066-7374 1467-9264 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00338.x |