Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners inv...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of monetary economics 2013-01, Vol.60 (1), p.113-133
Hauptverfasser: Broner, Fernando, Didier, Tatiana, Erce, Aitor, Schmukler, Sergio L.
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domestic agents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchment in both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for different types of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations driving capital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent with crises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under the presence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information. ► Gross capital flows are large and volatile especially relative to net capital flows. ► When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. ► International gross capital flows also display a pro-cyclical behavior. ► During expansions, gross flows increase. During crises, they collapse and retrench. ► The results suggest that crises affect foreign and domestic agents asymmetrically.
ISSN:0304-3932
1873-1295
DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.12.004