A Rope of Sand: Interpreting Locke's First Treatise of Government

The historiography of Locke's First treatise exhibits a vicious circle of oversight, prejudgement and caricature which has effectively prohibited detailed, structural interpretation of that work for generations. Twenty years ago the solitary voice of Herbert Rowen escaped the inertia and admonished scholars for their lack of attention. ‘There is more to the First treatise’, he argued, ‘than a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer's derivation of political authority from Adam in a straight line of inheritance.’ The central theme of the treatise had been misconstrued, Rowen thought, and that mistake helped to account for the general neglect. He urged a reassessment of the predominant dogma, maintaining that Locke's First treatise turns out to be an essential portion of his total argument on behalf of the social compact state, and against the dynastic (and potentially absolute) state. Though its argument is negative, the First treatise is necessary to Locke's major, positive work in the Second treatise because it clears and defines the ground for it. It therefore merits more attention than has usually been given to it.