Taking Rights Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies
The Critical Legal Studies movement has been described by one of its leading proponents as having “undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought and put another conception of law in their place.” Whether or not the movement has actually succeeded in doing so, this is a fair description of its...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Cambridge law journal 1989-07, Vol.48 (2), p.271-301 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The Critical Legal Studies movement has been described by one of its leading proponents as having “undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought and put another conception of law in their place.” Whether or not the movement has actually succeeded in doing so, this is a fair description of its ambition. The scholarship of the CLS movement disputes the idea that the power of judges and other government officials either can or should be constrained by sources of law such as constitutions, statutes, and precedent. It is marked by a rejection of the belief that “legal argument” can or should be an enterprise distinct from political argument. It is also marked by a rejection of “legal rights” as a desirable or even possible means of protecting individuals from government power. |
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ISSN: | 0008-1973 1469-2139 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S0008197300105318 |