Interpreting α-rationality in hierarchical games

Interpreting α-rationality in hierarchical games

We discuss here the connection between the game-theoretic representation of the principal-agent problem and its representation in terms of standard production and consumption sets. In addition we consider the issue of α-rationality as it applies in this framework.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 1980, Vol.5 (2), p.109-113
Hauptverfasser: Shefrin, H.M., Thaler, Richard
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We discuss here the connection between the game-theoretic representation of the principal-agent problem and its representation in terms of standard production and consumption sets. In addition we consider the issue of α-rationality as it applies in this framework.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/0165-1765(80)90082-8