The Electoral Effects of House Committee Assignments
Institutional patterns of decision-making in the U. S. Congress are thought to be a function of the overriding concern of its members with re-election. The committee system in particular is regarded as a major component in a near perfection re-election machine. Membership in committee provides the b...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of politics 1980-02, Vol.42 (1), p.307-319 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Institutional patterns of decision-making in the U. S. Congress are thought to be a function of the overriding concern of its members with re-election. The committee system in particular is regarded as a major component in a near perfection re-election machine. Membership in committee provides the basis for position taking, credit-claiming, and delivery of particularized benefits, and keeps bureaucrats attentive to an individual representative's constituents through control of appropriations and authorization of new programs. Thus, assignment to a committee would appear to be critical in terms of a member's electoral aspirations. |
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ISSN: | 0022-3816 1468-2508 |
DOI: | 10.2307/2130030 |