The Electoral Effects of House Committee Assignments

Institutional patterns of decision-making in the U. S. Congress are thought to be a function of the overriding concern of its members with re-election. The committee system in particular is regarded as a major component in a near perfection re-election machine. Membership in committee provides the b...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of politics 1980-02, Vol.42 (1), p.307-319
Hauptverfasser: Fowler, Linda L., Douglass, Scott R., Clark, Wesley D.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Institutional patterns of decision-making in the U. S. Congress are thought to be a function of the overriding concern of its members with re-election. The committee system in particular is regarded as a major component in a near perfection re-election machine. Membership in committee provides the basis for position taking, credit-claiming, and delivery of particularized benefits, and keeps bureaucrats attentive to an individual representative's constituents through control of appropriations and authorization of new programs. Thus, assignment to a committee would appear to be critical in terms of a member's electoral aspirations.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.2307/2130030