Common learning with intertemporal dependence

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distri...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of game theory 2013-02, Vol.42 (1), p.55-98
Hauptverfasser: Cripps, Martin W., Ely, Jeffrey C., Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps et al., Econometrica, 76(4):909–933, 2008 ). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning.
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-011-0313-7