Common learning with intertemporal dependence
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distri...
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Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of game theory 2013-02, Vol.42 (1), p.55-98 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents
commonly
learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps et al., Econometrica, 76(4):909–933,
2008
). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning. |
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ISSN: | 0020-7276 1432-1270 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-011-0313-7 |