Values in expert reasoning: A pragmatic approach

This chapter examines the proper role of moral and political values in the reasoning of scientists when providing knowledge for political use within expert bodies. The philosophical discussion has so far revolved around the choice between two apparently incompatible views, namely the value-free ideal, according to which such values should be minimized, and transactionism, according to which such values are acceptable and required in all parts of the reasoning of scientific experts. This chapter reframes the discussion. Using the role of scientists in unelected bodies as a source of examples, this chapter develops and defends a new view on the role of values in expert reasoning by taking a more pragmatic approach. Contrary to the approach of central contributors in the literature of articulating and defending an overarching and categorical principle or distinction that defines the proper role of ethical and political values in expert reasoning, I argue that articulating and defending a set of principles that together regulate the proper role of such values is a more feasible approach. According to the pragmatic view of values, scientific experts must interpret, balance, and weigh these principles on a case-by-case basis.