Expertise and the general will in democratic republicanism

This chapter takes issue with the claim that unelected expert bodies are inimical to democratic republicanism. Rather than undermining democracy, delegation of power to expert bodies can be justified as a way of approximating democratic ideals. This is not to say that uniting expert bodies with democratic law-making is frictionless and unproblematic. Experts can exert undue influence through framing of problems and marginalisation of alternative perspectives. While this is a persistent challenge related to modern democracy’s dependence on expertise, we should reject the claim that epistemic asymmetry between experts and laypersons necessarily conflicts with our equality as political reasoners. The main political function of public deliberation is to bring the impersonal force of valid arguments to bear on matters at hand. This function is not unavoidably threatened by epistemic asymmetries. Nor does our standing as political equals require complete epistemic transparency for everyone participating in public debates. We can expect permanent tensions between actual practice and the ideal of a democratic republic, but such tensions are not fatal. Democratic self-legislation is not inherently adverse to unelected expert bodies.