Introduction: Making the unelected safe for democracy

The massive build-up of knowledge-based institutions and their putative power, particularly in the transnational realm, is often seen as a threat to democratic self-rule. Is this criticism justified, or not? Can unelected, expert bodies be made safe for democracy? Knowledge-based decision-making is indispensable to modern democracies. Moreover, democracies cannot function without delegating some tasks to knowledge-producing bodies that are politically sheltered. However, the unelected, non-majoritarian institutions, like agencies and central banks, are not only dealing with technical issues but also involved in political decision-making. Inevitably, they wield political power. A justificatory account of the political role of expert bodies is lacking. The power of the unelected continues to be an anomaly in democratic theory. This chapter suggests a justificatory account of non-majoritarian institutions premised on the reason-giving principle, which allows us to see them as endowed with a democratic obligation. Due to their autonomous standing and their truth-based workings, the claim is that they may, in fact, be democracy’s ‘rescues’ rather than its ‘escapes’.