SARS: Reception and interpretations in three Chinese cities
In November 2002 a middle-aged government official in southern China fell ill with a virulent pneumonia that did not respond to typical therapies.1A month later a young chef who worked in a restaurant specializing in exotic wildlife in the booming city of Shenzhen presented similar symptoms and sough...
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Zusammenfassung: | In November 2002 a middle-aged government official in southern China fell
ill with a virulent pneumonia that did not respond to typical therapies.1A month later a young chef who worked in a restaurant specializing in exotic
wildlife in the booming city of Shenzhen presented similar symptoms and
sought treatment at a county hospital near his parents’ home. Unable to
improve the young chef’s breathing, the hospital transferred him to a
Guangzhou military hospital, and after three weeks on a ventilator he
recovered. Many months later, laboratory results would identify both men as
infected by the SARS virus; initially, though, neither case suggested a novel
virus or the specter of a global epidemic. (Abraham 2005: 31)By late January, however, the situation had become more ominous. The
number of cases of atypical pneumonia multiplied and several cases could
be directly traced to contact between the chef and those who had treated or
visited him in the hospital. The resistance of the disease to antibiotic treatment
and the rapid spread among hospital staff and then to their family members
alarmed provincial public health experts who quickly alerted the Chinese
Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Soon after, a team traveled from Beijing
to Guangzhou to meet with Dr. Zhong Nanshan, head of the Guangdong
Institute for Respiratory Disease. (Abraham 2005: 32) Led by Dr. Zhong,
they discovered that the atypical pneumonia spread via respiratory droplets
and outlined preventive measures of quarantine and infection control within
hospitals. (Abraham 2005: 33) Despite their clear recommendations and
professional expertise, central government officials failed to follow through
and the virus continued to spread. |
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DOI: | 10.4324/9780203967690-9 |