Modelling of pricing, crashing, and coordination strategies of prefabricated construction supply Chain with power structure
In the prefabricated construction industry, consumers are sensitive to the construction delivery time, and different power structures are very common. This research uses methods of Stackelberg game, Nash game and supply chain coordination, introduces a manufacturer crashing strategy into a prefabric...
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Veröffentlicht in: | PloS one 2023-08, Vol.18 (8), p.e0289630-e0289630 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | In the prefabricated construction industry, consumers are sensitive to the construction delivery time, and different power structures are very common. This research uses methods of Stackelberg game, Nash game and supply chain coordination, introduces a manufacturer crashing strategy into a prefabricated construction supply chain and investigates the assembler pricing, manufacturer crashing, and supply chain coordination strategies under three different power structures. It finds that adopting a crashing strategy improves the supply chain's profit, while the dynamic wholesale price contract achieves supply chain coordination. Meanwhile, when consumer time and price sensitivity are low, it is easier to achieve high profits in the supply chain under unequal power distribution. Conversely, the supply chain profit is higher in the case of a Nash game. This study innovatively introduces the thought of power structure and crashing strategy into the prefabricated construction supply chain, and provides the optimal price and delivery time under three different power structures for prefabricated construction enterprises and realizes supply chain coordination. The conclusion can provide decision suggestions for the prefabricated construction enterprises under different competitive environments. |
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ISSN: | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0289630 |