Functional equivalence and spatial path memory

Loomis, Klatzky, Avraamides, Lippa and Golledge ( 2007 ) suggest that, when it comes to spatial information, verbal description and perceptual experience are nearly functionally equivalent with respect to the cognitive representations they produce. We tested this idea for the case of spatial memory...

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Veröffentlicht in:Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006) 2011-11, Vol.64 (11), p.2081-2087
Hauptverfasser: Lyon, Don R., Gunzelmann, Glenn
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Loomis, Klatzky, Avraamides, Lippa and Golledge ( 2007 ) suggest that, when it comes to spatial information, verbal description and perceptual experience are nearly functionally equivalent with respect to the cognitive representations they produce. We tested this idea for the case of spatial memory for complex paths. Paths consisted entirely of unit-length segments followed by 90-degree turns, thus assuring that a path could be described with equal precision using either an egocentric verbal description or a virtual self-motion experience. The verbal description was analogous to driving directions (e.g., turn left and go one block, then turn right, etc.) except in three dimensions (allowing rotation followed by up or down movement). Virtual self-motion was depicted as first-person travel through a 3D grid of featureless corridors. Comparison of these two conditions produced a result that may be surprising to some, but nevertheless appears to support the notion of functional equivalence: Virtual self-motion does not produce better path memory than verbal description, when care is taken to present equally precise path information. This result holds for even very complex paths and despite evidence from proximity-based interference that the memory representation of the path is spatial.
ISSN:1747-0218
1747-0226
DOI:10.1080/17470218.2011.618227