Exit without Agreement

Chapter 4 examines another “unilateral” Israeli withdrawal: the “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Critics have labeled the disengagement as an ignominious concession in the face of the Second Intifada’s violence. Others have argued that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdrew to distract the public from corruption allegations against him. However, this chapter demonstrates that the withdrawal from Gaza was neither unilateral nor an irrational retreat. The Second Intifada did escalate the occupation’s costs. But exit was a rational choice because the status quo lost its strategic utility. Additionally, the withdrawal from Gaza cannot be reduced to policymakers appeasing a restless domestic arena, since the “disengagement plan” actually precipitated a domestic political crisis. Finally, bargaining between Israel and the US delineated the contours of withdrawal and concessions Israel would gain in return. Hence, the withdrawal from Gaza was not a “something for nothing” exit, nor was it unilateral.