Bankers on the Board and CEO Turnover

Bankers on the Board and CEO Turnover

The governance literature finds that independent directors from lending banks (commercial bank directors or CBDs) bring both financial expertise and conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. We examine how the presence of CBDs affects the implicit incentive of CEO turnover. Using B...

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Veröffentlicht in:Asia-Pacific journal of financial studies 2020, 49(1), , pp.119-152
Hauptverfasser: Kang, Min Jung, Kim, Andy (Y. Han), Chang, Jeung‐Yoon
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Banker directors
Board of directors
CEO turnover
Chief executive officers
Commercial bankers
Corporate governance
Implicit incentive
Turnover
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Zusammenfassung:The governance literature finds that independent directors from lending banks (commercial bank directors or CBDs) bring both financial expertise and conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. We examine how the presence of CBDs affects the implicit incentive of CEO turnover. Using BoardEx and DealScan data, we hypothesize and find that CBDs make the CEO turnover more sensitive to both performance and risk. Post‐CEO turnover analysis reveals that firm performance improves and risk decreases in the presence of CBDs.
ISSN:2041-9945
2041-6156
DOI:10.1111/ajfs.12288