State-Civil Society Synergy and Cooptation: The Case of the Minority Shareholder Movement in Korea
Shareholders buy shares on the market in order to profit from dividend payments and rising share prices. [...]active shareholders have an interest in influencing the management to increase dividends and share prices ("shareholder value"). Since the 1997/98 financial crisis, the government...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Korea observer 2008, 39(3), , pp.339-367 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Shareholders buy shares on the market in order to profit from dividend payments and rising share prices. [...]active shareholders have an interest in influencing the management to increase dividends and share prices ("shareholder value"). Since the 1997/98 financial crisis, the government and CSOs have complemented one another to improve MSR and curb the power of big business conglomerates. The surviving chaebols even grew in terms of economic power, in comparison to their state before the crisis. [...]Samsung, LG, SK, and the Hyundai chaebols have sustained if not increased their dominance over most markets. [...]in recent years, shareholder activism became more independent from the PSPD and gradually transformed from a CSO working for public interest to a lobby group for minority shareholders that is primarily interested in returns instead of reforms. |
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ISSN: | 0023-3919 2586-3053 |