US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy
In June 2000 the world watched the first-ever summit between South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. The historic event was a result of continuing commitment to the positive engagement policy towards North Korea by Kim Daejung`s "sunshine policy" since his...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Korean journal of defense analysis 2002, 14(1), , pp.197-216 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | kor |
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Zusammenfassung: | In June 2000 the world watched the first-ever summit between South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. The historic event was a result of continuing commitment to the positive engagement policy towards North Korea by Kim Daejung`s "sunshine policy" since his inauguration in early 1998. However, the totalitarian and repressive nature of the Kim Jong-il regime and its dependence on military force as a power source will remain as fundamental obstacles for any fundamental change in the North for peace and reconciliation with the South. The experience of detente and engagement policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union in the early 1970s shows the limit of one-sided engagement without changes in the other`s real intent. In this article, the author introduces two different strategy of engagement, conditioned and unconditioned engagement, as an analytical framework for understanding the logic and paradox of sunshine policy. |
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ISSN: | 1016-3271 1941-4641 |