Problems of the ROK–U.S. Combined Command Structure and Alternatives

The purpose of this study was to identify the problems and causes of the ROK–U.S. combined command structure and seek alternatives in connection with the transfer of wartime operational control, which will be an inflection point for the ROK– U.S. alliance. The current ROK–U.S. combined command structure is a political product of the ROK–U.S. alliance and has a structural problem of “one theater, two theater commands,” creating a temporal and spatial separation of the operation of Korean theater. Thus, ways to solve the problem should be explored within the political mechanism of the ROK–U.S. alliance, which is the cause of the problem. The ROK–U.S. alliance has been pushing for the transfer of wartime operational control since 2006. If the problems of the ROK–U.S. combined command structure are solved in connection with the transfer of wartime operational control, there are three options: the current deputy commander of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander, the ROK’s chairman of joint chiefs of staff concurrently serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander, or the ROK’s joint forces commander concurrently serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander. Among these, the most likely and feasible solution is the last option, which presupposes the creation of the ROK joint forces command. However, the establishment of the ROK joint forces command and joint forces commander’s dual service as a future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander must break away from the strong path dependence of the ROK military structure and the ROK–U.S. combined defense system, and overcome the ROK’s internal opposition. The corresponding approach should be long-term and step-by-step, and the transfer of wartime operational control of the ROK–U.S. alliance should be used as an event of deviation from path dependence and linked to the creation of the ROK’s strategic command. KCI Citation Count: 0