International Space Station (ISS) External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM) Jettison Options Assessment

On December 11, 2013, the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM). To minimize the number of extravehicular activities (EVA) required to replace the PM, jettisoning the faulty pump was evaluated. The objective of t...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Murri, Daniel G., Dwyer Cianciolo, Alicia, Shidner, Jeremy D., Powell, Richard W.
Format: Report
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:On December 11, 2013, the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM). To minimize the number of extravehicular activities (EVA) required to replace the PM, jettisoning the faulty pump was evaluated. The objective of this study was to independently evaluate the jettison options considered by the ISS Trajectory Operations Officer (TOPO) and to provide recommendations for safe jettison of the ETCS Loop A PM. The simulation selected to evaluate the TOPO options was the NASA Engineering and Safety Center's (NESC) version of Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2) developed to support another NESC assessment. The objective of the jettison analysis was twofold: (1) to independently verify TOPO posigrade and retrograde jettison results, and (2) to determine jettison guidelines based on additional sensitivity, trade study, and Monte Carlo (MC) analysis that would prevent PM recontact. Recontact in this study designates a propagated PM trajectory that comes within 500 m of the ISS propagated trajectory. An additional simulation using Systems Tool Kit (STK) was run for independent verification of the POST2 simulation results. Ultimately, the ISS Program removed the PM jettison option from consideration. However, prior to the Program decision, the retrograde jettison option remained part of the EVA contingency plan. The jettison analysis presented showed that, in addition to separation velocity/direction and the atmosphere conditions, the key variables in determining the time to recontact the ISS is highly dependent on the ballistic number (BN) difference between the object being jettisoned and the ISS.