What is the locus of abilities?

Loughlin's (2018) uses Wittgenstein's remarks in Philsophical Investigations to motivate his 'wide' view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgens...

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Veröffentlicht in:Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 2018, Vol.12 (2), p.19-30
1. Verfasser: Morales Carbonell, Felipe Andrés
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Loughlin's (2018) uses Wittgenstein's remarks in Philsophical Investigations to motivate his 'wide' view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgenstein's remarks on the notion of ability, the support for the wide view is not as straightforward. The criteria for using the concept of ability are highly context-dependent, and there is not a single account for them. This shows that at best, a moderate form of anti-individualism for cognitive capacities can be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds. Furthermore, the suggestion that ontological questions can be bypassed is questioned.
ISSN:2036-6728
2036-6728