Board Governance and Bank’s Performance: Does Size Matter?
Over the last few decades, corporate frauds have highlighted the significance of corporate governance in deriving firm performance. By using different sample data, extensive research has examined how corporate governance structure influences firm's profitability, but limited research was undert...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of Asian finance, economics, and business economics, and business, 2020-11, Vol.7 (11), p.817-825 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | kor |
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Zusammenfassung: | Over the last few decades, corporate frauds have highlighted the significance of corporate governance in deriving firm performance. By using different sample data, extensive research has examined how corporate governance structure influences firm's profitability, but limited research was undertaken on the banking sector of Pakistan. This research adds to the literature by testing how board structure derives bank's performance by using sample data of 19 banks for the period from 2010 to 2017. In addition, the study analyzes the controlling part of size on the link between board governance and bank performance. Findings reveal that banks having small board size, fewer non-executive directors and minimum activity level perform better. Analysis related to bank size illustrates that board size has value in increasing benefits in large size banks in contrast to small size one, while higher participation by board members enhances performance of small size banks more. The correlation results and findings showed that there existed no multicollinearity issue between independent variables. Board size showed positive correlation with the market variable, while board activity tended to correlated negatively with the market performance. Inverse correlation between board size and independent directors indicated that Pakistani banks with greater board size had fewer independent directors. |
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ISSN: | 2288-4637 2288-4645 |