The role of taxes in forced CEO turnover

The role of taxes in forced CEO turnover

Our study examines whether low and high levels of tax avoidance lead to forced CEO turnover. While prior research argues that firms often do not engage in tax avoidance due to reputational concerns, the empirical evidence suggesting the existence of reputational costs is scarce. Using a sample of fo...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Proceedings (Conference on Taxation) 2015-01, Vol.108, p.1-28
Hauptverfasser: Chyz, James A., Gaertner, Fabio B.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Chief executive officers
Coefficients
Corporate taxes
Effective tax rate
Empirical evidence
Fees
Financial leverage
Income taxes
Inside Corporate Structure and Decision Making
Taxpaying
Total taxes
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Our study examines whether low and high levels of tax avoidance lead to forced CEO turnover. While prior research argues that firms often do not engage in tax avoidance due to reputational concerns, the empirical evidence suggesting the existence of reputational costs is scarce. Using a sample of forced CEO changes from Fee et al. (2013), we find no relation between the payment of low taxes and forced turnover. We do, however, find that forced CEO turnover is more likely when the firm pays a high tax rate. Our results are consistent with the existence of individual reputational costs of not engaging in tax avoidance.
ISSN:1549-7542
2377-5661