CONVENTIONAL VERSUS NUCLEAR POWER FOR CVA-67: A STUDY OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

In recent years Robert McNamara and the revolutionary methods he brought with him to DOD have been the focus of considerable dissatisfaction voiced by military men as well as civilian critics of the Defense Establishment. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in Mr. McNamara's methods of analyzing and passing judgment on alternative weapons systems. By reexamining the now familiar arguments of both the former Defense Secretary and his critics in the context of a relatively unpublicized issue–the selection of conventional vice nuclear power for CVA-67–a better appreciation of the roles played by both the institutions and individuals involved may emerge. In this particular issue, the findings take exception to two basic tenets of the McNamara philosophy–the implied doctrine that the military did not know what was best for itself and the doctrine of sufficiency, which in effect states that second best is good enough.