"Der Chef des Kalten Krieges". C.D.Jackson, psychologische Kriegführung und die deutsche Frage 1953/54

This article discusses the evolution of the Eisenhower Administration's Cold War strategy within the German context in 1953-54. By focusing on the role of C.D.Jackson, Eisenhower's Special Assistant for psychological warfare, it seeks to highlight the basic dilemma facing that strategy: the incompatability between the rhetoric of "liberating" Eastern Europe, including East Germany, from Communism with the pragmatic goal of rearming West Germany and integrating it into the Western Alliance. Using three historical examples - U.S. policy during the transition of power in Moscow after Stalin's death, the American response to the East German uprising, and the Berlin Conference on German reunification - it contrasts Jackson's advocacy of a more forceful and dynamic American foreign policy with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' skepticism about the need for psychological warfare operations in Germany and his conviction about the need for alliances. The author argues that the growing tension between these conflicting tendencies in U. S. Cold War strategy eventually forced the administration to commit itself more firmly to the containment doctrine at the expense of "liberation".