Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?

Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?

There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physi...

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Veröffentlicht in:The British journal for the philosophy of science 2015-03, Vol.66 (1), p.69-93
1. Verfasser: Skow, Bradford
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Mathematics
Philosophy of science
Physics
Principles
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Zusammenfassung:There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts.
ISSN:0007-0882
1464-3537
DOI:10.1093/bjps/axt038