Systèmes de contrôle de connaissances, modalités de gouvernements et rôle social des établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Hypothèses de recherche

The argument of this paper is that the social function of institutions of higher education is correlated with the type of examination system they apply and the government structure. The examination system is, first of all, essential to the academic prestige of the institution. This can consist either in a strong selection procedure at the time of entry, or in an internal competitive attitude in relation to final results. The same is true of professional schools leading to prestigious professional careers. Conflicts within prestigious institutions are mild, or non existant, because all participants accept the rules of the game in view of the overall objectives of the institution. The authors then analyse some of the possible conflicts and their participants as originated in different types of examination systems. When considering the correlation between examination systems and the power structure within institutions, the authors distinguish three types of higher education institution. 1. the "prestige institutions" which are highly selective at entry and are legitimized internally and externally by their particular place and function with the overall system of higher education e.g. the French "grandes écoles". Students have more say in their studies as they are confirmed in their special status by their success in the entrance selection procedure; 2. institutions with "value added", i.e. those with a weak or non-existant entrance selection, but with a great prestige attached to the final result and a high social expectation (e.g. medical or law schools). Their internal rules are stricter, and they possess a power structure with a strong internal legitimizing force as their function is to increase the social value of the diplomas of the graduate. 3. the "parking" institutions, i.e. those which do not offer prestige to their graduates, and which do neither select nor impose strong examination systems. They do not have a strong government structure, hence the openness of the internal conflicts. The authors analyse further the special case of the conflicts of the "parking" institutions and emphasize the difficulty of managing these conflicts in view of the weakness of the end result of the studies proposed. They see, in the "parking" institution the environment favourable to social change. But the hypothesis presented at the end proposes a balance between three systems made up of the three types of institutions, one being a source of change, while the other two