Moral invention in meaningconstituting systems

Purpose To present the concept of moral invention as discussed by philosopher Paul Ricoeur and to examine how the selections operated by systems described by Niklas Luhmann as meaningconstituting systems allow for the emergence of distinctions that would qualify as moral invention. Designmethodologyapproach Ricoeur's philosophical position on ethics and morality is rooted in Husserlian phenomenology. So is Niklas Luhmann's description of meaningconstituting systems and his discussion of their capacity to produce meaningful distinctions, including ethicomoral ones. An interdisciplinary approach is used in order to highlight the conditions under which moral invention could become possible. In order to provide grounds for further discussions across disciplines, the extensive use of quotations is deemed necessary so that the material referred to can be traced back within Luhmann's extensive corpus, written and published in many languages. Findings Propositions are formulated as comments following the presentation of three of Luhmann's statements about meaning. These propositions indicate how meaningconstituting systems could make distinctions or selections that would qualify as moral inventions. Originalityvalue To shows how secondorder cybernetics and philosophy, using as a common basis a description of meaning inspired by Husserlian phenomenology, can develop complementary propositions about ethics and morality.