Games and Quantity implicatures

Games and Quantity implicatures

In this paper we seek to account for scalar implicatures and Horn's division of pragmatic labor in game-theoretical terms by making use mainly of refinements of the standard solution concept of signaling games. Scalar implicatures are accounted for in terms of Farrell's ( 1993 ) notion of...

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Veröffentlicht in:The journal of economic methodology 2008-09, Vol.15 (3), p.261-274
1. Verfasser: van Rooij, Robert
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Bayesian analysis
Conversation
conversational implicatures
Game theory
Horn's division
Intuitive Criterion
Language use
neologism-proofness
Pragmatics
Studies
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper we seek to account for scalar implicatures and Horn's division of pragmatic labor in game-theoretical terms by making use mainly of refinements of the standard solution concept of signaling games. Scalar implicatures are accounted for in terms of Farrell's ( 1993 ) notion of a 'neologism-proof' equilibrium together with Grice's maxim of Quality. Horn's division of pragmatic labor is accounted for in terms of Cho and Kreps' ( 1987 ) notion of 'equilibrium domination' and their 'Intuitive Criterion'.
ISSN:1350-178X
1469-9427
DOI:10.1080/13501780802321376