The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and the Implications for the Evolution of Russia's Federal System

On Sept 13, 2004, Russia's second president, Vladimir Putin, declared the Kremlin's intention of recasting the existing regional system by the introduction of an initiative to cancel gubernatorial elections in the regions. This came as a response to the bloodiest terrorist attack in the country's history, which resulted in the massacre of a large number of children in Beslan. While official accounts of the new policies on the regions emphasized the need to create an effective institutional system that could react adequately to the existing challenges of terrorism, the reasons behind the launch of these initiatives were also much more complex, and more likely associated with the limitations and failures of the federal reforms conducted from 2000-2004, as well as with a range of challenges and threats facing Russia's regional system at present. An analysis of the balance of power between the center and the regions that had emerged by the end of the first term of Putin's presidency demonstrates the existence of a large number of concessions and compromises granted by the federal center to the country's constituent units. It is the aim of this article to examine the limitations of the power potential of the federal center in the regions during the first term and at the beginning of the second term of Putin's presidency, which triggered the tightening of central control over regional politics.