Security Analysis of a Path Validation Scheme With Constant-Size Proof

Security Analysis of a Path Validation Scheme With Constant-Size Proof

We analyze a path validation scheme with constant-size proof (published in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security) and demonstrate that this scheme fails to achieve unforgeability. An adversary can forge a valid proof with a non-negligible probability.

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 2021, Vol.16, p.4246-4248
Hauptverfasser: Wu, Yangyang, Jiang, Changsong, Xu, Chunxiang, Chen, Kefei
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Cryptoanalysis
Encryption
Forensics
Forgery
Mathematics
Message authentication
path validation
proof forgery
Public key cryptography
Research and development
Security
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We analyze a path validation scheme with constant-size proof (published in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security) and demonstrate that this scheme fails to achieve unforgeability. An adversary can forge a valid proof with a non-negligible probability.
ISSN:1556-6013
1556-6021
DOI:10.1109/TIFS.2021.3101043