Permutation-based biometric authentication protocols for mitigating replay attacks

A biometric replay attack occurs when a victim's biometric information (in the form of a template) is stolen by a hacker as it is transmitted over a network and used by the hacker to impersonate the victim to gain unauthorized access. Biometric replay attacks can be particularly devastating because the victims of these attacks cannot easily alter their biometrics or the templates associated with their biometrics [1]. In an effort to mitigate biometric replay attacks, the authors of [2] proposed two biometric authentication protocols. These protocols are based on two principles: (a) it is possible to evolve a set of distinct feature extractors (FEs) and (b) distinct FEs produce distinct templates. These principles gave rise to the concept of disposable FEs (and templates). In this paper, we introduce two additional protocols based on disposable FEs and templates. Our results show that these new protocols can be used more efficiently than the two proposed in [2].