Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect

For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effo...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Li Gongxiang, Yin Yilin
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effort degree of the agent enterprise was analyzed with the influence of the reputation effect, and incentive methods of government principal were discussed based on the reputation effect under the cases of symmetry and asymmetric information. The results show that the reputation effect is conducive to encourage the agent enterprise to work harder and the government principal could achieve the long-term incentive effect by adjusting the incentive structure and increasing the reputation incentive.
DOI:10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461305